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Cumulative Effects of Brexit and Other UK and 
EU27 Bilateral FTAs on the World’s Wine Markets 
 




Over the past six decades, wine’s share of UK alcohol consumption has steadily risen from 
5% to more than one-third, so wine traders, distributors and retailers as well as wine 
consumers are concerned about the UK’s planned withdrawal from the European Union 
(Brexit). Brexit is also attracting the attention of wine producers and consumers outside the 
UK, because the UK accounts for a major share of the world’s wine imports. This product 
thus makes an ideal case study of the various impacts of the Brexit vote and follow-on 
consequences on a commonly purchased product. 
  The immediate trade-reducing and trade-diverting effects of altering bilateral import 
tariffs are the focus of standard comparative static economic theory of (withdrawal from) a 
customs union. But the process of exiting, establishing new trading arrangements and 
adjusting to the altered incentives is inherently uncertain and expected to spread over many 
years, and initially to slow the growth of UK incomes and devalue the pound. Therefore, one 
needs to begin with a projection of how wine markets would have looked without Brexit in 
several years and then show how that projected baseline might change under various 
scenarios involving a replacement trade agreement between the UK and EU27 and 
subsequent FTAs with non-EU trading partners. We do that using a model of the world’s 
wine markets projected to 2025.  
  The paper begins by summarizinges what trade theory would lead one to expect for a 
country leaving a customs union.1 A model of the world’s wine markets is then outlined, 
along with a description of the way in which the model projects forward and of how that 
                                                 
1 It was not yet certain as of midt end-20187 whether the UK would seek to form a UK-EU27 customs union. 
But that would require the UK to retain the EU’s tariff policy, continue to allow freedom of movement of 
labour, and remain under the European Court of Justice – none of which Brexiteers want. We therefore ignore 
this possibility and, following Rollo et al. (2016) and Smith (2017), assume that the UK will commit to the 
current EU tariff schedule at the WTO in the first instance and then seek a free trade agreement (FTA) with the 
EU27. Other trading partners will want to wait and see what that FTA looks like before signing on to a bilateral 
FTA of their own with the UK. Meanwhile, the EU has been pursuing other bilateral trade agreements (see EC 
2015), but most of those too are unlikely to be completed before the settling of a new trade arrangement 
between the UK and EU27.  
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projection can be altered to simulate the effects of Brexit and subsequent bilateral trade 
agreements on those markets. The model’s results of prospective changes to grape and wine 
markets by 2025 for a baseline case are then summarized, followed by results for a range of 
additional adjustments following Brexit. They are then compared with the effects of a 
multilateral agreement to remove all wine import tariffs. Unrealistic though the latteris is, it 
exposes the far bigger contributions toresponses by wine producers and consumers that could 
emerge from a single multilateral undertaking than from several bilateral or regional FTAs. 
The final section draws out implications of the findings for wine markets and their 
participants in the UK and abroad, both within and outside the EU.  
 
II. EXPECTED EFFECTS OF LEAVING A CUSTOMS UNION 
 
When countries join a customs union and impose a common external tariff on imports from 
non-union countries, there can be net trade creation (depending on the height of the common 
external tariff relative to the previous national tariffs), but there will also be trade diversion 
(because of the preference to producers within the union – see Viner 1950). If the overall 
consequence of joining the union is trade-liberalizing for a member, its real income is likely 
to rise. When a country leaves a union, the reverse happens, because the leaving country’s 
tariffs will now apply to its imports from union countries as well as from the rest of the world 
(and its real income is likely to fall, assuming the leaver’s tariff rates are not reduced). Hence 
imports from the union will fall, because their preferential access to the leaving country will 
no longer apply. That is also the case for countries that enjoy a free trade agreement (FTA) 
with the union. Of greatest significance to wine are the EU’s FTAs with Chile and South 
Africa (although there are more than 30 other bilateral or regional FTAs with the EU that the 
UK may wish to replicate after its exit).  
How large the trade-diverting impact of leaving the union will be on wine depends on 
the external tariff imposed on wine imports not only by the union but also by the leaving 
country. Some have suggested the UK should become the Hong Kong of Europe and go 
immediately to free trade on all products. Others have suggested that this would impose huge 
structural changes on the UK economy which that its society would not tolerate, at least not 
without major compensation packages. But both groups agree that a new trade policy which 
that sets most-favored-nation tariff rates is needed before the UK can begin to negotiate new 
preferential trading arrangements with the EU27, its FTA partners such as Chile and South 
Africa, or any other country. Rollo et al. (2016) suggest the most practical trade policy for the 
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UK to adopt at the outset is the EU’s tariff schedules previously agreed to at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In all but one of the Brexit scenarios examined below, we assume this 
will be the new UK trade policy commitment to WTO members, and that subsequent 
negotiations for preferential arrangements will take years, and any consequent agreements 
with the EU and others will be gradually implemented after that. 
The impact of leaving a highly integrative customs union on wine markets comes not 
only from tariff changes, however. Also relevant are any effects the uncertainty associated 
with the decision to leave has on real UK incomes and the value of the pound. If the UK were 
to move to free trade on all products (the Hong Kong option), its per capita income could 
eventually rise, but only after considerable adjustment. Should instead the UK commit to the 
current EU tariff schedule at the WTO in the first instance, as we assume below, then its per 
capita income growth rate and the pound’s exchange rates almost certainly will be lower for 
some time – at least until new trade agreement negotiations with the EU27 and others are 
sufficiently advanced as to restore investor and consumer confidence in the UK economy. 
Support for that notion was provided initially by Campos (2016). A more-comprehensive 
assessment of macroeconomic effects by Dhingra et al. (2017), using a general equilibrium 
model, estimates welfare losses for the average UK household of 1.3% if the UK remains in 
the EU’s Single Market (a softer Brexit than we consider below) and 2.7% if the UK leaves 
the Single Market (a ‘hard’ Brexit). When the dynamic effects of Brexit on productivity are 
taken into account, those estimates more than treble to between 6.3% and 9.4% per capita, 
partly via falls in foreign investment. (See also Born et al. 2017, Emerson et al. 2017, 
Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr 2017, and Sampson 2017.)  
The assumed adverse macroeconomic effects of Brexit will add to the initial impact of 
altered wine tariffs on aggregate wine consumption in the UK and hence on its bilateral 
trades in wine. They will make the loss of wine sales to the UK by EU (and Chilean and 
South African) suppliers greater than would otherwise be the case. And they reduce the 
likelihood that other countries’ sales of wine in the UK will be higher than in the baseline. 
That is, even countries currently discriminated against by the EU28’s wine trade policy may 
be worse off because of Brexit if the adverse macroeconomic effects outweigh the positive 





III. GLOBAL WINE MARKETS MODEL AND DATABASE 
 
We use a model of the world’s wine markets summarized in Anderson and Wittwer (2013). It 
is a partial equilibrium model that follows the theory of computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models (Dixon et al. 1982). Unlike the CGE approach, the model depicts the input 
structures and sales patterns only of the grape and wine sectors, which comprise a small 
fraction of economic activity in wine-producing nations.  
Consumers follow a linear expenditure function within the model, although aggregate 
consumption is assumed to be exogenous, given the small budget share of wine in total 
consumption. The model includes anling includes expenditure function so as to projections 
markets to 2025, since this. This requires projectiongs of aggregate consumption growth, 
with a distinction between fast- growing economies such as China and other emerging 
economies relative to slower- growing Western economies (see Appendix Table A1), with a 
taste swing towards higher- quality wines and away from lower- quality wines and provision 
for higher- quality wines to have higher income elasticities than lower- quality wines. The 
linear expenditure system and provision for taste swings as formulated in the theory of the 
World Wine Model enables us to capture each of these attributes.  
  
Wine from different national origins is assumed to be imperfectly substitutable, 
following the Armington (1969) assumption. The model is implemented using GEMPACK 
software (Harrison et al. 2016).  
 
  The World Wine Model disaggregates wine markets into four types, namely non-
premium, commercial-premium and super-premium still wines, and sparkling wine.2 There 
are two types of grapes, namely premium and non-premium. Non-premium wine uses non-
premium grapes exclusively, super-premium wines use premium grapes exclusively, and 
commercial-premium and sparkling wines use both types of grapes to varying extents across 
countries. In the model’s database the world is divided into 44 individual nations and 7 
composite geographic regions that capture all other countries. That database is calibrated to 
2014, based on the comprehensive wine market volume and value data and trade and excise 
tax data provided in Anderson, Nelgen and Pinilla (2017). It is projected forward assuming 
                                                 
2 Commercial-premium still wines are defined by Anderson, Nelgen and Pinilla (2017) to be those between 
US$2.50 and $7.50 per litre pre-tax at a country’s border or wholesale.  
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aggregate national consumption, population, and real exchange rates change between 2014 
and 2025 to the extent shown in Appendix Table 1. The alternatives to that baseline also are 
projected to 2025. As for preferences, there is assumed to continue to be a considerable swing 
towards all wine types in China and a swing away from non-premium to premium wines in 
all other countries through to 2025. And in the baseline scenario, both grape and wine 
industry total factor productivity are assumed to grow at 1% per year everywhere, while 
grape and wine industry capital is assumed to grow net of depreciation at 1.5% per year in 
China but zero elsewhere. 
  Two alternative scenarios for the initial impact of Brexit are considered (‘hard’ and 
‘soft’). In those scenarios the rate of UK real GDP growth is only one-third or two-thirds as 
fast over the projection period (0.9% or 1.8% per year instead of 2.6%), and the UK pound 
will be 20% or 10% lower in real terms, than in the model’s core baseline projection.3 In both 
Brexit scenarios it is assumed the UK applies the EU’s external tariffs on wine at the end of 
the agreed transition period following the UK’s formal triggering of Article 50.  
  We consider a ‘soft’ Brexit to be the result of the UK negotiating, signing, 
implementing and responding to, by 2025, a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU27. We 
therefore modelled a subsequent scenario in which the pound and real incomes in the UK are 
as in our ‘soft’ initial Brexit scenario but also involving an FTA between the UK and the rest 
of the EU that removes the tariffs on wine in UK-EU27 trade.  
  Various additional bilateral FTAs are then assumed to be signed sequentially. Just 
prior to the Brexit decision, the EU announced it would be pursuing other bilateral trade 
agreements, with Australia and New Zealand as early possibilities (EC 2015). The UK too 
has signalled that it too will be looking to sign FTAs with non-EU trading partners as soon as 
it has settled a new trade arrangement with EU27. Again Australia and New Zealand have 
been mentioned as early possibilities (they account for one-fifth of the value of UK wine 
imports), as have Chile and South Africa (whose share is one-sixth, with all other non-EU 
suppliers accounting for just one-eighth of UK wine imports). Each of these FTAs may have 
some trade-creating effects, but none is likely to have significant positive macroeconomic 
effects to offset the adverse macro effects of the prolonged uncertainty introduced by Brexit. 
They will, however, have some trade-diverting effects that may offset each other, just as has 
                                                 
3 The nominal US$ price of the pound in the fortnight following the Brexit vote on 23 June 2016 dropped 13% 
to US$1.30, and 16 months later the pound sat at a similar rate. Our choice of a low of 10% and a high of 20% 
aims to capture future possible rates while uncertainties remain. The average real wage in the UK fell in the first 
half of 2017, and projected real GDP growth during 2018-20 was revised down to 1.7% in the UK’s latest 
Budget (HM Treasury 2017). 
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happened with recent bilateral FTAs between wine-exporting countries and three Northeast 
Asian countries (see Anderson and Wittwer 2015). 
   
 
IV. HOW MIGHT BREXIT AFFECT WINE MARKETS BY 2025? 
 
In the absence of Brexit, global wine production and exports are projected in the model’s 
baseline from 2014 to 2025 to be consistent with past trends: the global volume of production 
(and consumption) rises little over that 11-year period (9%), made up of a 6% decline in non-
premium wine and a one-sixth rise in commercial and super-premium wine. In real (2014 
US$) value though, global wine output and consumption increase by about 50% as the 
average quality rises. The international trade projections are similar although a little larger, 
with the share of global wine production exported (= share of global consumption imported) 
rising two percentage points between 2014 and 2025. The baseline projection does not alter 
greatly the 2014 shares of various countries in global wine production. When sub-divided 
into fine wine (super-premium still plus sparking), commercial premium wine and non-
premium wine, France and the US retain the highest two places on the global ladder for fine 
wine production, and Spain and Italy retain the top two places for non-premium wine. As for 
commercial premium wine production (defined to be those between US$2.50 and $7.50 per 
litre pre-tax at a country’s wholesale level or national border), Italy retains the top ranking 
over our projections period but, at least in terms of value, China challenges France for 2nd 
place. France, Italy and Spain remain the three dominant exporters of wine in aggregate 
value. France and then Italy are even more dominant in fine wine exports, and remain so by 
2025, while Italy outranks France in the commercial premium export category, and Spain 
outranks Italy, Australia and then Chile in the non-premium export class. Among the 
importers the US and UK are projected to continue to hold the first two places in 2025 in 
value terms, but China moves into third place slightly ahead of Germany in the absence of 
Brexit.  
 
a. Initial impact of Brexit 
 
As mentioned earlier, we consider two alternative scenarios to capture the initial effects of 
Brexit (‘hard’ and ‘soft’). We assume that, following the UK’s exit from the EU, the rate of 
UK economic growth would be only one-third or two-thirds as fast for the period to 2025, the 
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UK pound would be 20% or 10% lower in real terms than in our model’s baseline projection, 
and the UK would apply the EU’s external tariff on wine to imports from EU member 
countries (as part of establishing MFN rates via the WTO in order to then start new bilateral 
FTA negotiations). In the first of these initial scenarios it is assumed the UK does not 
implement any new free trade agreements, particularly with the EU27, Chile and South 
Africa. The second (‘soft’) scenario is assumed to be more pertinent if and when an FTA 
between the UK and EU27 is agreed. Generally the results are about half as big in the ‘soft’ 
scenario, with the exception of the bilateral trade effects. To show the sensitivity of results to 
our assumptions, we point out the differences when the ‘soft’ results are not close to half the 
results shown for the ‘hard’ scenario. 
  As compared with the baseline scenario to 2025, in the ‘hard’ Brexit scenario the 
consumer price of wine in 2025 is 2216% higher in the UK in local currency terms (2010% 
because of real depreciation of the pound, 48% because of the new tariffs on EU, Chilean and 
South African wines, and -2% because of slower UK income growth). The volume of UK 
wine consumption is 28% lower: 16% because of slower UK economic growth, 79% because 
of real depreciation of the pound, and 53% because of the new tariffs. Super-premium still 
wine sales are the most affected, dropping by two-fifths, while sparkling and commercial 
wines would drop a bit less than one-quarter. Since the average price rises by more than the 
fall in the volume sold, the aggregate value of UK sales even in local currency terms would 
fall in this ‘hard’ Brexit case. Under the ‘soft’ Brexit scenario, the consumer price of wine in 
2025 would be 11% higher in the UK and its volume of wine consumption would be 17% 
lower. 
  The volume of projected UK imports in 2025 is 427 million litres (ML) or nearly one-
quarter lower in the ‘hard’ scenario than in the baseline scenario, comprising 58 ML less 
sparkling, 31 ML less super-premium still wine, and 339 ML less commercial wine. World 
imports would be lower by just 239 ML because imports by other countries would be 189 ML 
higher in response to the international prices of wines being lower in this scenario. In value 
terms UK imports are $1.75 billion (or 27%) lower in 2025 because of ‘hard’ Brexit: $1.13 
billion because of lower incomes, $0.38 billion because of the fall in the pound, and $0.14 
billion because of the rise in wine import tariffs (Table 1). These aggregate trade impacts are 
a little more than half as large under the ‘soft’ Brexit scenario. 
  Despite the levels of imports falling because of raised import tariffs, domestic 
consumption of all three quality categories of UK-produced wine is lower with than without a 
‘hard’ Brexit, because of the shrunken demand for all wines resulting from the lowered UK 
8 
 
incomes and their raised local price because of the devaluation of the pound. The pound’s 
devaluation does make it easier for the UK to sell wines abroad though: their exports are 7 
ML or nearly 5% higher in 2025 in the ‘hard’ Brexit scenario, and UK production is 3% 
higher. Those UK exports (or re-exports of imported bulk wine after it is bottled in the UK) 
that go to EU27 countries are reduced though because of the tariff now imposed at the new 
EU border. 
  Without Brexit, the UK’s shares of global wine imports are projected to be slightly 
higher in volume terms in 2025 than in 2010-15, but 2 percentage points lower in value terms 
thanks to East Asia’s expanding demand for imports of premium wines. With a ‘hard’ Brexit, 
however, that value share would be a further 2 percentage points lower, and the volume share 
would be almost 5 points lower. Most of the trade effect of a ‘hard’ Brexit is a large decline 
in net imports of wine by the UK with very little offsetting positive effect on trade in the rest 
of the world. The ‘soft’ Brexit numbers are a bit more than half these for a ‘hard’ Brexit. 
  The aggregate effect of a ‘hard’ Brexit on the market shares of various wine-exporting 
countries in the UK is almost indiscernible. The projected 2025 shares are quite different 
from the actual 2014 shares for several countries. They are much smaller in 2025 for South 
Africa, Australia and New Zealand (and the US in volume terms), and are much larger in 
volume for Spain and in value for Italy. This is because wine-exporting countries benefit 
differentially from the varying rates of growth in net import demand for wine in non-UK 
countries in the no-Brexit baseline over this projection period. The most important projected 
changes are the increase in the real value of annual wine imports between 2014 and 2025 by 
China (200% or $3 billion), Other Asia (110% or $2.2 billion) and Africa (270% or $1.6 
billion). More than half of Australia’s increase in annual exports from 2014 to 2025 go to 
Asia, and more than half of South Africa’s increase in exports go to other Africa. 
  Table 2 reveals that European, Chilean and South African wine exports are lowered 
by a ‘hard’ Brexit, by 150 ML or US$1.2 billion in the case of the EU, with some of their 
exports diverted from the UK to EU27 and other markets in competition with New World 
exporters. While the US, Australia and Argentina sell only a little less into the UK, they sell 
less also to other countries. For Chile and South Africa, who lose their preferential access to 
UK (but not to EU27) markets in this Brexit scenario, some of their exports are re-directed 
from the UK to EU27 countries but again they export less overall. Global wine trade in 2025 
would be less under this ‘hard’ Brexit scenario by 240 ML (1.9%) or $1.8 billion (3.5%). The 
percentage by which wine exporters’ trade shrinks is greater for values than for volumes 
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because of changes in relative prices of different-quality wines. Those differences are shown 
in the numbers in parentheses in Table 2.  
  A number of other points are worth making about Table 2. One is that Australia sells 
slightly more to the UK in the ‘soft’ Brexit scenario, rather than slightly less as in the ‘hard’ 
Brexit case. Evidently the negative income and price (devaluation) effects do not more than 
offset the positive trade-diverting effect on Australian exports to the UK of removing 
preferences in the ‘soft’ scenario. Second, New Zealand sells slightly more to non-UK 
countries under Brexit, despite greater competition from EU27, Chile and South Africa. This 
anomaly is due to changes in the relative prices of different qualities of wine in global wine 
markets, bearing in mind that New Zealand has the world’s highest average price for still 
wine exports. And third, the value (but not the volume) of exports of ‘Other’ countries to 
markets other than the UK is higher under Brexit. This too is due to changes in the relative 
prices of different qualities of wine in global wine markets. 
 
b. Subsequent impact of Brexit from a UK-EU27 FTA  
  
The next most-likely step in the Brexit process is for the UK to negotiate a new trade 
arrangement with the EU27. We therefore assume that a UK-EU27 FTA with free bilateral 
wine trade is implemented and adjusted to by 2025, and that progress toward that end occurs 
soon enough that the adverse macroeconomic shocks from the initial impact of uncertainty 
over the Brexit process are confined to those assumed in our ‘soft’ scenario outlined above.  
  This subsequent development in the Brexit process would reverse the sign of most of 
the initial effects of Brexit by 2025, but be only a partial offset to them because of our 
assumption of lost growth in the initial years of uncertainty. (The longer it takes before this 
FTA is finalized and implemented, the longer will the estimated initial adverse effects persist 
and so the larger will be the cumulative cost of Brexit to UK wine consumers and to grape 
and wine producers in wine-exporting countries.) 
  Table 3 summarizes the subsequent trade effects for 2025. It suggests that only one-
sixth of the loss in volume and one-twelfth of the loss in value of world trade in wine from 
the initial ‘soft’ impact would be restored. Most of that improved outcome is because of 
recovered imports from EU27, commensurate with the latter’s high share of UK imports 
(52% by value in 2013-14).  
  This subsequent (FTA) step in the Brexit process thus can be expected to restore by 
2025 only a little of the initial adverse effects in the UK of the Brexit vote. The boost to 
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world wine trade of just $84 million from this FTA is small because the EU’s tariff on wine is 
so small (a weighted average of 13 pence per litre). As is evident from the final column of 
Table 1, the tariff itself is a very minor contributor to the adverse effect of Brexit, compared 
with the macro effects.   
 
  
V. EFFECTS OF NEW BILATERAL FTAs WITH NON-EU COUNTRIES 
 
The signing of new trade agreements affecting wine trade will not end with just the UK-EU27 
FTA. While President Trump has ruled out the planned Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and US, the EU has signaled it wants other bilateral 
FTAs, including with Australia and New Zealand. So too does the UK, and it would also seek 
FTAs with other countries that currently have agreements with the EU, most notably Chile 
and South Africa in terms of wine trade importance. Meanwhile, in December 2017 an EU-
Japan Economic Partnership agreement was finalized, which will see Japan’s tariff on wine 
imports from the EU removed. In this section we examine the cumulative impact of such a 
sequence of FTAs on the value of wine exports from key countries and globally. 
  Bilateral EU27-Australia and EU27-New Zealand FTA agreements add about half as 
much again to the global trade increase due to the UK-EU27 FTA. Most of that extra benefit 
is enjoyed by the signing partners – more than offsetting their loss from the UK-EU27 FTA – 
while a small additional loss of sales is imposed on other exporters (columns 1 and 2 of Table 
4). 
  When new bilateral FTA agreements are then implemented between the UK and four 
Southern Hemisphere exporters, global exports expand a little further, benefitting not only 
Australia and New Zealand but also Chile and South Africa but at the expense of exporters in 
the EU27 and the US (column 3 of Table 4). 
  The new EU-Japan Economic Partnership agreement further boosts global wine 
exports, but in this case virtually all of that benefit is enjoyed by EU27 exporters while other 
wine exports lose a little from this new preferential arrangement (column 4 of Table 4). 
  All of these prospective FTAs, even including the UK-EU27 FTA, raise the value of 
world wine trade in 2025 by less than 0.5% compared with the original baseline projection for 
2025. This is because the gross trade creation of each FTA is reduced by considerable trade 
diversion, whereby one exporter’s gain is largely at the expense of other exporting countries.  
11 
 
  To see how close those FTAs get the world to free international trade in wine, we also 
ran a scenario in which all import tariffs on wine are removed multilaterally. The results of 
that scenario are reported in the final two columns of Table 4. Clearly the gains are far 
greater, and far more evenly spread among wine exporters, when all tariffs are removed 
simultaneously rather than just a few being removed preferentially. The value of world wine 
trade would be 7% greater in 2025 with all wine tariffs eliminated, which is sixteen times the 
cumulative increase from the above-listed sequence of FTAs. 
 
VI. CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The above simulations are just a few of many scenarios that could be modelled following the 
Brexit vote in June 2016. The sequence in which FTAs are signed and the speed with which 
they are implemented will matter (as was also the case with the sequential signing over the 
past decade of bilateral FTAs with Northeast Asian countries by Chile, Australia and New 
Zealand, see Anderson and Wittwer 2015).  
  We have assumed above that no changes are made to alcohol excise duties in any 
country, including the UK following Brexit, when in fact they are scheduled to be 
progressively raised with inflation in the UK and some other countries. They may be raised in 
various countries for health reasons too, and possibly raised even more for wine relative to 
spirits and beer in the UK to offset the opposite effects of Brexit on those two domestic 
industries. Even without a change in relative consumer tax rates of beverages, consumption 
of local beers and spirits are likely to rise relative to wine consumption because of Brexit. 
  Brexit will be costly initially to UK consumers of wine (and of many other tradable 
products), because the domestic retail price in local currency tax-inclusive terms will be 
higher than otherwise and the volume of wine consumed domestically will be lower unless 
and until a UK-EU27 FTA comes into force. Even if such an FTA does get signed, ratified by 
all 28+ parliaments and implemented by 2025, the slower income growth in the interim will 
mean a smaller UK wine market in 2025. The volume reduction will be a blow to many 
participants in UK wine bottling, transporting, storing, wholesaling and retailing businesses, 
in addition to restaurants and pubs. Very little of that initial impact is because of higher 
import tariffs; most important is the assumed fall in UK real incomes relative to what they 
would have been if the UK vote in June 2016 had been to remain in the Single Market. A fall 
in real incomes will dampen growth in consumption of other beverages also. 
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  Even with a UK-EU27 FTA in place, EU27 wine exporters are projected to export 
US$625 million less wine in 2025 thanks to Brexit, Chile and South Africa to export $158 
million less wine, Australia and New Zealand export $93 million less, and Argentina and the 
United States $92 million less.  
  There will be great uncertainly for some time yet over the possible policy outcomes to 
flow from Brexit, and of their consequent sequential impacts on UK household disposable 
incomes, foreign exchange rates, and bilateral wine tariffs. Meanwhile, the above projections 
under explicit assumptions provide some idea of how wine markets might be affected by the 
most-likely first two stages of the Brexit process (agreeing on a new tariff schedule at the 
WTO, and agreeing to and implementing a UK-EU27 FTA). In particular, they make clear 
that there could be non-trivial initial adverse impacts on the domestic wine market, effects 
that are likely to be much larger than just the direct impact of changes in bilateral tariffs. In 
any event, the net effect of Brexit on the welfare of the world’s consumers and producers of 
wine as a whole will be negative not just initially but permanently unless new trade policy 
commitments by the UK with major wine-exporting countries are sufficiently more liberal 
than current arrangements.  
  As for the gains to wine producers and consumers that could emerge from a single 
multilateral undertaking to remove all import tariffs on wine, they would be even greater if 
that multilateral agreement involved liberalizing all product markets and thus boosting global 
incomes. Unfortunately, however, the world’s leaders seem disinterested in any such 
undertaking at present, as witnessed in the lack of any substantive communique to come out 
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Table 1: Difference in 2025 projected volume and value of wine imports by the United Kingdom and the rest of the world as a consequence of  
the initial Brexit shock (ML and 2014US$ million, ‘hard’ scenario) 
 
 Volume (ML) Value (US$ million) 
 NP + CP
a Super Prb Sparkling TOTAL % NP + CP
a Super Prb Sparkling TOTAL % 
ΔUK imports due to:           
   Lower incomes  -198 -20 -29 -247 58 -644 -253 -234 -1131 65 
   Lower pound -70 -10 -14 -93 22 -248 -127 -102 -476 27 
   Higher tariffs -71 -1 -16 -87 20 -110 -8 -24 -143 8 
   TOTAL -339 -31 -58 -427 100 -1001 -388 -360 -1750 100 
% diff. from base 23 32 33 25  24 32 32 27  
% of total cuts 79 7 14 100  57 22 21 100  
           
ΔROW net imports 141143 2121 2525 187189  -126230 129143 -83-181 -79192  
ΔWORLD TRADE 








a Non-premium plus Commercial Premium still wines    b Super-premium still wines 
 
Source: Authors’ model results. 
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Table 2: Difference in 2025 bilateral wine import volumes and values from key exporters by 
the UK and rest of the world (RoW) as a result of initial Brexit shock (ML and 2014US$m)a 
(a) ‘hard’ Brexit scenario 
       Volume (ML)           Value (2014US$m)  
 
UK RoW WORLD (%) 
 
UK RoW WORLD (%) 
          
EU27 -287 136 -150 (-1.7) 
 
-1187 -5 -1192 (-3.1) 
Chile -59 35 -25 (-3.0) 
 
-169 31 -138 (-4.8) 
Sth. Africa -53 35 -18 (-3.2) 
 
-105 20 -85 (-6.7) 
USA -7 -6 -13 (-2.4) 
 
-75 -40 -115 (-5.0) 
Australia -4 -3 -7 (-0.9) 
 
-25 -65 -90 (-3.0) 
Argentina -3 -9 -12 (-4.8) 
 
-16 -39 -55 (-5.2) 
NewZealand -11 9 -2 (-0.9) 
 
-162 71 -91 (-4.3) 
Others -2 -10 -12 (-0.2) 
 
-11 -52 -63 (-4.4) 
WORLD -427 187 -240 (-1.9) 
 
-1750 -79 -1829 (-3.5) 
 
(b) ‘soft’ Brexit scenario 
       Volume (ML)           Value (2014US$m)  
 
UK RoW WORLD (%) 
 
UK RoW WORLD (%) 
          
EU27 -178 82 -96 (-1.2) 
 
-692 -43 -736 (-1.9) 
Chile -46 28 -18 (-2.4) 
 
-128 36 -91 (-3.2) 
Sth. Africa -43 29 -14 (-4.2) 
 
-82 23 -59 (-4.7) 
USA 1 -6 -5 (-1.1) 
 
-23 -28 -51 (-2.2) 
Australia 5 -10 -5 (-0.6) 
 
19 -56 -38 (-1.3) 
Argentina 0 -6 -6 (-2.6) 
 
-3 -25 -29 (-2.7) 
NewZealand -5 4 -1 (-0.6) 
 
-80 34 -46 (-2.2) 
Others 0 -9 -9 (-0.1) 
 
-1 -33 -34 (-2.4) 
WORLD -266 112 -154 (-1.3) 
 
-991 -92 -1083 (-2.1) 
 
a Numbers in parentheses are the percentage difference between the Brexit and baseline 
scenarios for 2025 projected wine import volumes or values by source.  
 
Source: Authors’ model results. 
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Table 3: Difference in 2025 bilateral wine import volumes and values from key exporters by 
the UK and rest of the world (RoW) as a result of implementing a UK-EU27 FTA (difference 
relative to initial ‘soft’ Brexit shock, ML and 2014US$ million)a 
 
                  Volume (ML)                           Value (2014US$m)  
 








          
EU27 67 -38 30 (-96) 
 
169 -58 111 (-736) 
Chile -8 7 -1 (-18) 
 
-27 22 -5 (-91) 
Sth. Africa -5 5 0 (-14) 
 
-14 11 -3 (-59) 
USA -4 2 -1 (-5) 
 
-16 6 -10 (-51) 
Australia -7 6 0 (-5) 
 
-26 19 -7 (-38) 
Argentina -2 1 0 (-6) 
 
-6 4 -2 (-29) 
NewZealand -1 1 0 (-1) 
 
-6 4 -2 (-46) 
Others -2 2 0 (-9) 
 
-6 8 2 (-34) 
WORLD 40 -13 27 (-154) 
 
69 16 84 (-1083) 
 
a Numbers in parentheses are the world trade differences between the ‘soft’ initial Brexit 
scenario before the FTA is implemented and the baseline scenario, copied from columns 3 
and 7 of Table 2(b).  
 




Table 4: Cumulative impacts of additional FTAs, and of multilateral free trade in wine, on the 
value of national and global wine exports in 2025 (difference relative to ‘soft’ Brexit with 





















EU27 122 105 188 2137 6% 
Australia + NZ 30 45 44 368 8% 
Chile + S. Africa -10 16 12 379 10% 
USA -11 -18 -24 219 10% 
Rest of world -1 3 3 451 13% 
WORLD 131 150 222 3553 7% 
a ‘NW’ includes Australia, NZ, Chile and South Africa 
Source: Authors’ model results.  
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Appendix Table A1: Cumulative consumption and population growth rates and changes in 











France 18 4 -11 Australia 35 11 -17 
Italy 11 2 -9 New Zealand 32 9 -26 
Portugal 14 0 -9 Canada 27 8 -18 
Spain 26 8 -9 United States 31 8 0 
Austria 19 4 -7 Argentina 7 10 109 
Belgium 20 7 -9 Brazil 16 8 -29 
Denmark 22 2 -9 Chile 55 8 -2 
Finland 21 3 -7 Mexico 42 12 -8 
Germany 14 -2 -11 Uruguay 45 3 1 
Greece 22 -1 -14 Other L. Am 60 10 -5 
Ireland 42 12 -9 South Africa 36 12 -1 
Netherlands 21 4 -9 Turkey 50 8 20 
Sweden 24 9 -13 North Africa 53 11 0 
Switzerland 18 8 -6 Other Africa 109 18 84 
United Kingdom 32 6 1 Middle East 52 18 -12 
Other W. Europe 21 10 -1 China 79 3 5 
Bulgaria 41 -7 7 Hong Kong 42 3 2 
Croatia 20 -2 -1 India 134 13 17 
Georgia 35 0 23 Japan 11 -3 -24 
Hungary 25 -3 -11 Korea 38 1 -9 
Moldova 49 -11 13 Malaysia 62 15 -16 
Romania 45 -4 22 Philippines 75 18 7 
Russia 18 -2 -8 Singapore 44 21 -22 
Ukraine 22 -5 14 Taiwan 29 1 -13 
Other E. Europe 40 -5 48 Thailand 47 3 -9 
  Other Asia 99 10 10 
a RER changes over the projection period are the changes expected in the nominal value of country i’s currency 
relative to the US dollar times the expected ratio of the GDP deflator for the US versus that for country i. 
Source: Authors’ compilation from projections by various international agencies and from 
global economy-wide modeling by Anderson and Strutt (2016). 
